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Analysis of Ground Ambulance Crash Data From 2012 to 2018

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This study reviewed ground ambulance						
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National Automotive Sampling System						
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active in 40.7 percent of the SCI crash						
operator/driver error. Improper clearing						
contributing factors in SCI crashes. A						
patients. Findings suggest priority countermeasures to improve ground						
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Executive Summary

Background and Objectives


Ground ambulance crashes are the leading cause of death on the job among emergency medical services (EMS) personnel (Reichard et al., 2011; Maguire & Smith, 2013; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). To understand the problem, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's (NHTSA) Office of Emergency Medical Services (OEMS), Office of Behavioral Safety Research (OBSR), National Center for Statistics and Analysis (NCSA), and Special Crash Investigations (SCI) unit studied ground ambulance-involved crashes for the years 1992 to 2011 (NHTSA, 2014). The study examined ambulance-involved crashes in national databases and reviewed SCI reports focused on ambulance crashes to identify factors contributing to ambulance-involved crashes and injuries. The current study's objective was to review ambulance crashes that occurred from 2012 to 2018 and identify priority countermeasures to increase ambulance safety.

Methods

This study queried NHTSA's Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS), the National Automotive Sampling System (NASS) General Estimates System (GES), and the Crash Report Sampling System (CRSS) for ambulance-involved crashes from 2012 to 2018. The study also included a review of all SCI reports focused on ground ambulance crashes from 2012 to 2018. Experts in crash investigations and ambulance operations reviewed each SCI report and summarized the most critical investigation findings. After reviewing the study findings, the experts and research staff gave priority recommendations on countermeasures to address the identified problems.

Results

Ambulance-involved fatal crashes remained relatively rare from 2012 to 2018 with a national average of 24.7 fatal crashes per year and 28.4 fatalities per year reported in FARS. Of the individuals killed, 40.2 percent were ambulance occupants (operators/drivers, front seat passengers, and clinicians or patients in the cabin), 52.3 percent were occupants of other vehicles involved in the crash, and 7.5 percent were non-occupants (e.g., pedestrians, bicyclists), as shown in Figure 1. In 2013, data began to include lights and sirens status. From 2013 to 2018, some 28 percent of the ambulance-involved fatal crashes occurred when lights and sirens were reported to be active. Analyses of the NASS GES and CRSS data indicated that approximately 36.2 percent of injury crashes occurred when the ambulance was reported to have lights and sirens active (2013 to 2018 data only) and of those injured in crashes involving an ambulance with reported lights and sirens in use, 24.4 percent were occupants inside the ambulance.



Source: FARS 2012-2017 Final File, 2018 Annual Report File (ARF). N = 199. Figure 1. Crash Position of Each Fatality

The SCI reports (n=27) for 2012 to 2018 showed nearly all crashes (92.6%) involved ambulance operator/driver error. Improper clearing of intersections, traveling against red lights, and operator fatigue were noted as factors in the crashes. Lights and sirens were active in 40.7 percent of the crashes. The expert reviewers noted that lights and sirens were often used in situations that were not recommended according to best-practice guidelines.

A key finding in the SCI crash reports was lack of proper restraint use by clinicians and patients. Only 8.8 percent of clinicians in the patient compartment were properly restrained, and no occupants in the front passenger seat were properly restrained. While 95.7 percent of the patients were restrained in some manner, only 17.4 percent were properly restrained by both lateral belts and shoulder harnesses.

Discussion

The study's results indicate several priority areas to promote and improve ground ambulance safety: (1) Strengthen organizational safety polices; (2) Reduce operator errors through training; (3) Create a culture of safety; and (4) Adopt new vehicle safety designs or technologies.

Countermeasures already exist to address some of the problems identified by this study. NHTSA and other safety partners recommend that all operators complete an emergency vehicle operator course specific to ambulances to reduce operator errors (NHTSA, 1995; Thomas et al., 2019). The *Ambulance Driver Best Practices* guide describes recommended lights and sirens use and how to implement a quality fatigue management program for ambulance operators and clinicians (Boone et al., 2013). Ambulance patient care compartment standards have been rewritten to make it easier for clinicians to remain safely restrained while treating patients (Avery et al., 2015; Green, 2017), but many older ambulances without updates remain in service. Once new vehicle safety designs or technologies are adopted, clinicians will need training on how to properly use the new designs. These countermeasures require commitment at the organizational level to implement good policies and continuous monitoring of operators and clinicians to ensure best practices are always followed. If organizations, operators, and clinicians create a culture of safety, the EMS system and patients served will benefit from safer operations on the roadways.

Introduction

Ground ambulance crashes are the leading cause of death on the job among EMS personnel (Reichard et al., 2011; Maguire & Smith, 2013; Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2018). To understand the problem, OEMS, OBSR, NCSA, and SCI previously researched ground ambulance-involved crashes for the years 1992 to 2011 (NHTSA, 2014). The study examined NASS GES and FARS data for ground ambulance-involved crashes from 1992 to 2011. The estimated number of ambulance-involved property-damage only (PDO), crashes ranged between 2,600 and 3,200 crashes per year. The estimated number of injury crashes trended downward from an average of 1,800 annually between 1997 and 2001 to an average of 1,400 between 2007 and 2011. Analyses of FARS data did not show substantial changes over time as ambulance-involved fatal crashes averaged about 29 per year with an average of 33 fatalities per year.

As part of the same 2014 research, OEMS reviewed SCI reports for 2005 to 2012 when an ambulance was involved in the crash (Smith, 2015). In the cases reviewed, 78 percent of vehicle drivers wore seat belts but only 16 percent of EMS personnel in the patient compartment wore restraints. While 96 percent of patients were restrained in some manner, only 33 percent were restrained correctly with both lateral belts and shoulder harnesses. Patients who were not properly restrained were more likely to be ejected from ambulances and sustain serious or fatal injuries. Other factors identified as possibly contributing to the crashes were operator fatigue and equipment defects.

Since the 2014 study, several new ambulance technologies (e.g., computer aided dispatch software, road closure notification systems, and electronic navigation systems) have emerged that may affect ambulance crash risk (Hsiao et al., 2018). Guidelines for patient compartment design improvements were developed to reduce EMS clinician injuries in the event of a crash (Avery et al., 2015). These design improvements are being incorporated in national ambulance design standards and should lead to the production of safer ambulances (Green, 2017). With the improved restraint designs, EMS personnel can more readily access essential equipment and provide care while remaining restrained in the patient compartment (Green et al., 2010). In addition, a wide variety of new crash avoidance technologies are entering the passenger vehicle fleet separate from ambulances and many areas of the country are seeing substantial improvements in infrastructure for pedestrians and bicyclists which could affect ambulance-involved crashes.

Given the noted changes in technology, ambulance design, general driving environment, and the creation of the CRSS, this study focused on the most recently available ambulance-involved crash data and SCI reports.

Objective

This study's objective was to examine ground ambulance crashes from 2012 to 2018 by analyzing national level crash data and SCI reports where an ambulance was involved.

Methods

The study queried FARS, NASS GES, CRSS, and SCI databases for ground ambulance crashes from 2012 to 2018. The crash, person, and vehicle variables from each database were selected as described below.

Fatality Analysis Reporting System

FARS data are collected annually through cooperative agreements between NHTSA and the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. The data set is a census of police-reported traffic crashes where an involved person died within 30 days of the crash. Analysts in each State enter many crash, person, and vehicle level data points into the system using a standard form. The FARS analysts gather this data from several sources.

- Police crash reports
- State vehicle registration files
- State driver licensing files
- State highway department data
- Vital statistics
- Death certificates
- Coroner/medical examiner reports
- EMS reports

The system has several range checks to make sure valid entries are being made. NHTSA's FARS team then conducts further quality control checks and makes imputations for missing variables (e.g., driver blood alcohol concentration) where appropriate. The result is a standardized database that can be analyzed to examine fatal crashes at both the national and local level. In March 2020 the study team downloaded Statistical Analysis System (SAS)¹ versions of the FARS data for crashes from 2012 to 2018 from the NHTSA File Downloads website at https://www.nhtsa.gov/file-downloads?p=nhtsa/downloads/FARS.

The vehicle files contained codes for the types of vehicles involved in each crash. To be included in this study, the crash must have involved a ground ambulance. Furthermore, only crashes where the vehicle was in transit were selected (i.e., crashes were excluded if a parked ambulance was involved. Some variables in the files changed over time as new codes and variables were added which required the study team to conduct recoding to allow comparisons over time for those variables. This report provides notes where appropriate to indicate how variables were recoded to arrive at the measures of interest.

National Automotive Sampling System General Estimates System

NASS GES is a nationally representative probability sample of police-reported crashes ranging from minor property damage to fatalities for the years 1988 to 2015. The dataset is composed of police crash reports selected from 60 areas of the country to reflect the geography, roadway mileage, population, and traffic density of the United States. NASS GES data collectors gathered police crash reports from 400 police jurisdictions within the selected areas. Approximately

¹ SAS Institute Inc, Cary, NC. <u>www.sas.com/en_us/home.html</u>

50,000 reports were randomly sampled each year. Data elements were extracted from the reports and coded in a standardized format.

SAS versions of the NASS GES data files for crashes from 2012 through 2015 were downloaded from the NHTSA File Downloads website at <u>https://www.nhtsa.gov/file-downloads?p=nhtsa/downloads/GES</u>.

Crash Report Sampling System

CRSS replaced NASS GES in 2016 and uses a national probability-based crash sampling system that is different than the sampling strategy that was used for NASS GES. CRSS was designed to be more representative of crashes across the country. The database includes fatal, injury, and PDO only crashes. Police crash reports are selected from 60 designated areas reflecting the geography, population, miles driven, and crash distribution in the country. SAS versions of the CRSS data files for crashes from 2016 to 2018 were downloaded from the NHTSA File Downloads website at https://www.nhtsa.gov/file-downloads?p=nhtsa/downloads/CRSS.

CRSS uses the same file and variable structure as FARS and NASS GES. As such, the crash and variable selection criteria used for the NASS GES data were applied to CRSS data.

Special Crash Investigation Reports

SCI reports are the result of comprehensive motor vehicle crash investigations for a limited number of crashes of special interest to NHTSA each year. Approximately 200 investigations are performed annually. SCI includes extensive follow-up research on a crash including additional collection and assessment of driver and occupant data, in-person vehicle interior and exterior inspections, safety systems inspections, crash scene inspections, and medical record reviews. SCI tends to focus on current hot topics within the highway safety community and are not designed to be generally representative of crashes.


SCI reports that focused on ground ambulance crashes for 2012 to 2018 were accessed from the NHTSA Crash Viewer, Special Crash Investigations at https://crashviewer.nhtsa.dot.gov. Searches for ambulance-involved crashes resulted in 27 reports for review. Subject matter experts (SMEs) in crash investigations and ambulance operations reviewed the identified SCI reports and completed the coding document in Appendix A to summarize the most critical findings of each investigation. At least two SMEs reviewed each SCI report and discussed their findings to come to a consensus on how to complete each field in the coding document. A senior SME reviewed all reports to provide additional insights regarding fault and factors contributing to the ground ambulance crashes.

Results

Fatal Crashes Involving an Ambulance (FARS Data)

Figure 2 provides FARS-based counts of the annual number of fatal crashes and fatalities when an in-transit ambulance was involved for the years 2012 to 2018. Overall, a total of 173 ambulance-involved fatal crashes resulted in 199 fatalities during these seven years. The years 2012 and 2018 had a higher number of crashes and fatalities than the other years. There was an average of 24.7 fatal ambulance-involved crashes per year from 2012 to 2018 with an average of


28.4 people killed per year in those crashes.



Source: FARS 2012-2017 Final File, 2018 ARF.

Figure 2. Ambulance-Involved Fatal Crashes and Fatalities by Year

Figure 3 provides the crash position of those people who were fatally injured in an ambulanceinvolved crash. Over half (52.3%) of people killed in ambulance-involved crashes were occupants of other vehicles (i.e., not occupants of the ambulance), 34.2 percent were ambulance passengers, 7.5 percent were non-occupants (e.g., pedestrians, bicyclists), and 6% were ambulance operators (drivers). Ambulance passengers could have been patients or EMS personnel in the patient care compartment, or people riding in the front passenger seat.




Source: FARS 2012-2017 Final File, 2018 ARF. N = *199.*

Figure 3. Crash Position of Each Fatality


Figure 4 shows whether the ambulances were in "emergency use" at the time of the fatal crashes. In 2012, FARS did not differentiate whether emergency use included emergency equipment (lights and sirens) in use versus emergency operation with lights and sirens off. Later years included more data codes for emergency operation that could be selected. To allow for the best comparisons to the 2012 data, researchers combined the following three emergency use codes for the 2013 to 2018 data into "emergency use."

- Emergency operation, emergency warning equipment in use
- Emergency operation, emergency warning equipment not in use
- Emergency operation, emergency warning equipment unknown


All other emergency use codes for 2013 to 2018 were combined into "non-emergency use" for the purposes of this report, including cases where emergency use was not reported, reported unknown, or listed as not applicable. Combined across 2012 to 2018, 45.7 percent of fatal crashes involved an ambulance reported to be in emergency operation.



Source: FARS 2012-2017 Final File, 2018 ARF.



Starting in 2013, FARS began including codes that indicated whether emergency warning equipment (i.e., lights and sirens) were active when an ambulance crashed during emergency use. Overall, 28 percent of fatal crashes in Figure 5 were reported to have emergency lights and sirens in use by the ambulance at the time of the crash.




Source: FARS 2013-2017 Final File, 2018 ARF.

Figure 5. Emergency Lights/Sirens Use in Fatal Crashes by Year

Estimated Property Damage Only and Injury Crashes

Figure 6 shows NASS GES and CRSS annual estimates of ground ambulance PDO and injury (excluding fatalities) crashes for 2012 to 2018. Table 1 provides annual estimated PDO crash counts and averages by data source for the years covered by each and totals across all years combined.² Table 2 provides annual estimated injury crash counts and averages.



Sources: NASS GES 2012-2015; CRSS 2016-2018.

Note: Comparisons over time should be made with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.

Figure 6. Estimated Annual PDO and Injury Crashes by Year

² NASS GES and CRSS data were combined to provide some measures for the entire period covered by this report to make comparisons to NHTSA's prior research easier, but these results should be interpreted with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS. Similarly, comparisons of NASS GES to CRSS annual estimates should be made with caution.

Year	PDO Crashes ^a	Annual Mean
2012 NASS GES	3,859	
2013 NASS GES	4,219	
2014 NASS GES	5,065	
2015 NASS GES	4,249	
NASS GES Subtotal	17,392	4,348.0
2016 CRSS	5,217	
2017 CRSS	5,344	
2018 CRSS	5,858	
CRSS Subtotal	16,419	5,473.0
Grand Total ^a	33,811	4,830.1

Table 1. Estimated Annual PDO Crashes by Year


^aTotal PDO crashes and averages that combine data from NASS GES and CRSS databases should be interpreted with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.

Year	Injury Crashes	Annual Mean
2012 NASS GES	1,290	
2013 NASS GES	1,506	
2014 NASS GES	1,794	
2015 NASS GES	1,353	
NASS GES Subtotal	5,943	1,485.5
2016 CRSS	1,540	
2017 CRSS	1,401	
2018 CRSS	1,038	
CRSS Subtotal	3,979	1,326.3
Grand Total ^a	9,922	1,417.3

Table 2. Estimated Annual Injury Crashes by Year


^aTotal Injury crashes and averages that combine data from NASS GES and CRSS databases should be interpreted with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.

Figure 7 provides the annual estimated number of people injured (excluding fatalities) when an ambulance was involved in a crash for 2012 to 2018. Table 3 provides annual estimated injury counts and averages by data source for the years covered by each and totals across all years combined.



Sources: NASS GES 2012-2015; CRSS 2016-2018.

Note: Comparisons over time should be made with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.




Year	Injuries	Annual Mean
2012 NASS GES	2,686	
2013 NASS GES	2,914	•
2014 NASS GES	2,494	
2015 NASS GES	2,269	
NASS GES Subtotal	10,363	2,590.85
2016 CRSS	1,892	
2017 CRSS	2,592	
2018 CRSS	2,683	
CRSS Subtotal	7,167	2,389.3
Grand Total ^a	17 ,530 °	2,504.4°

Table 3. Estimated Annual People Injured by Year

^aTotal People Injured and averages that combine data from NASS GES and CRSS databases should be interpreted with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.


Figure 8 shows the estimated position in crash of injured people from 2012 to 2018 when estimates for all years are combined. Figure 9 provides the position in crash data from NASS GES for 2012 to 2015 combined, and Figure 10 shows the data from CRSS for 2016 to 2018 combined. As shown in the figures, regardless of data source, about half of the injured people are occupants of other vehicles. Consistent with NHTSA's prior study of data from 1992 to 2011, non-occupants of a vehicle (e.g., pedestrians and bicyclists) were not included in these analyses because so few were involved in ambulance crashes in the databases that the estimates were not reliable when the data were broken down in this manner. Cases with unknown or not reported positions in the crash were also excluded from these analyses.



Sources: NASS GES 2012-2015; CRSS 2016-2018.

Note: This figure combines NASS GES and CRSS data (N = 16,622). Interpretations of the combined data should be made with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS. Non-occupants and cases with unknown positions were excluded from this analysis to be consistent with the approach used by a prior NHTSA study.


Figure 8. Estimated Position in Crash of Injured People, 2012 to 2018



Sources: FARS 2012-2015 Final Files; NASS GES 2012-2015. N = 9,690.

Note: Non-occupants and cases with unknown positions were excluded from this analysis to be consistent with the approach used by a prior NHTSA study.

Figure 9. Estimated Position in Crash of Injured People, 2012 to 2015



Sources: FARS 2016-2017 Final Files, 2018 ARF; CRSS 2016-2018. N = 6,932.

Note: Non-occupants and cases with unknown positions were excluded from this analysis to be consistent with the approach used by a prior NHTSA study.


Figure 10. Estimated Position in Crash of Injured People, 2016 to 2018

As with FARS in 2012, NASS GES did not specify whether emergency equipment (lights and sirens) were in use during emergency operation. Later years included more data codes for emergency operation that could be selected. To allow for the best comparisons to 2012 data, researchers combined the following three emergency use codes for the 2013 to 2018 data into "emergency use."

- Emergency operation, emergency warning equipment in use
- Emergency operation, emergency warning equipment not in use
- Emergency operation, emergency warning equipment unknown.

All other emergency use codes for 2013 to 2018 were combined into "non-emergency use" for the purposes of this report, including cases where emergency use was not reported, reported unknown, or listed as not applicable.

Figure 11 and Table 4 show that reported emergency use for injury crashes fluctuated over time. Combined across 2012 to 2018, some 59 percent of the estimated injury crashes involved an ambulance reported to be in emergency operation.



Sources: NASS GES 2012-2015; CRSS 2016-2018.

Note: Non-emergency use crashes in Figure 11 include unknown, not reported, and not applicable emergency use codes. Comparisons over time should be made with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.


Figure 11. Estimated Ambulance in Emergency Use in Injury Crashes by Year

Year	Emergency Use Crashes	Annual Mean
2012 NASS GES	984	
2013 NASS GES	701	
2014 NASS GES	969	
2015 NASS GES	1,030	
NASS GES Subtotal	3,684	921.0
2016 CRSS	859	
2017 CRSS	649	
2018 CRSS	659	
CRSS Subtotal	2,167	722.7
Grand Total ^a	5,851	836.0

Table 4. Estimated Ambulance in Emergency Use in Injury Crashes by Year


^aTotal injuries and averages that combine data from NASS GES and CRSS databases should be interpreted with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.

Figure 12 and Table 5 show the estimated number of injury crashes when the ambulance had emergency equipment in use (i.e., lights and sirens) during emergency operation for 2013 to 2018. Combined across 2013 to 2018, 36.2 percent of estimated injury crashes were reported to involve an ambulance with lights and sirens in use.



Sources: NASS GES 2012-2015; CRSS 2016-2018.

Note: Non-emergency use crashes in Figure 11 include unknown, not reported, and not applicable emergency use codes. Comparisons over time should be made with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.



Note: Comparisons over time should be made with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.

Sources: NASS GES 2013-2015; CRSS 2016-2018.

Year	Lights/Siren Use Crashes	Mean
2013 NASS GES	701	
2014 NASS GES	368	
2015 NASS GES	797	
NASS GES Subtotal	1,866	621.7
2016 CRSS	398	
2017 CRSS	339	
2018 CRSS	523	
CRSS Subtotal	1,260	420.3
Grand Total ^a	3,126	521.0

Figure 12. Estimated Ambulance Emergency Lights/Sirens Use for Injury Crashes by Year

Table 5. Estimated Ambulance Emergency Lights/Sirens Use for Injury Crashes by Year

^aTotal injuries and averages that combine data from NASS GES and CRSS databases should be interpreted with caution given changes in sampling criteria between NASS GES and CRSS.

Factors Identified in SCI Investigated Crashes

A wide variety of factors related to the ambulance operator/driver, clinician, environment, and drivers of other involved vehicles appeared to play a part in the crashes covered by the SCI reports. The summary below provides the percentages of the 27 SCI crashes that a given factor was identified by the SMEs as possibly contributing to the crash. Non-ambulance vehicles were involved in 19 of the crashes reviewed.

Pre-Crash Factors (*n* = 27)

- Lights and sirens active (40.7%)
- Dark (33.3%)
- Inclement weather (22.2%)
- Ambulance proceeded through intersection against red light (7.4%)
- Poor visibility (3.7%)

Ambulance Operator/Driver Related Factors (N = 27)

- Driving errors (92.6%)
 - o Hazard awareness/avoidance (92.6%)
 - o Situational awareness (92.6%)
 - o Speeding (14.8%)
- Unbelted (14.8%)
- Improper clearing of intersection (14.8%)
- Fatigue (11.1%)
- Impaired by alcohol or other drugs (3.7%)
- Medical condition (3.7%)
- Distracted (e.g., GPS or cell phone use) (3.7%)

Ambulance Passenger Restraint Use

- Clinician (N = 37) unrestrained (91.9%)
- Patient (N=23)
 - o Shoulder harness and lateral belt restraints used (17.4%)
 - o Lateral belt only used (78.3%)
 - o Unrestrained (4.3%)

Driver of Other Involved Vehicle(s) Factors (N = 19)

- Driving errors (73.7%)
 - o Wrong lane (36.8%)
 - o Ran red light or stop sign (21.1%)
 - o Failed to yield to ambulance (15.8%)
 - o Passed vehicle slowing down, pulling over, or stopping for ambulance (15.8%)
 - o Speeding (5.3%)
 - o Driving much slower than the speed limit (5.3%)
- Did not hear or see ambulance lights and sirens (10.5%)
- Impaired by alcohol or other drugs (5.3%)

SMEs considered the ground ambulance operator was at fault or partially at-fault in causing 51.8 percent of the SCI crashes, as shown in Table 6.

Ambulance Operator Fault	Number	%
Yes	11	40.7
Partially	3	11.1
No	13	48.1

Table 6. Ambulance Operator At-fault in SCI Crashes

Source: SCI Crash Reports, 2012-2018.

Figure 13 shows EMS personnel seat belt/restraint use rate by seating position in the ambulance for the 27 SCI crashes. The great majority of operators/drivers (85.2%) were wearing seat belts at the time of the crashes. However, belt use was lower when lights and sirens were in use (8 of 11 operators belted; 72.7%) versus when they were off (15 of 16 operators belted; 93.8%). Overall, only 8.8 percent of clinicians in the patient compartments were properly restrained and none (0 out of 3) of the clinicians riding in the front passenger seats were restrained during the crashes. None (0 out of 18; 0.0%) of the clinicians were restrained when lights and sirens were in use and only a few (3 out of 19; 15.8%) were restrained when lights and sirens were off during the crashes.






Figure 13. EMS Personnel Restraint Use by Seating Position in SCI Crashes

While 95.7 percent of patients were restrained in some manner, only 17.4 percent were fully restrained with lateral belts and shoulder harnesses. Forty-four percent of patients were ejected from the cots and none of those ejected had shoulder harnesses on. Table 7 shows patient restraint use when lights and sirens were in use versus off.

	Lights and Sirens (N = 10)	No Lights and Sirens (N = 13)	Total (N = 23)
Туре	%	%	%
Shoulder harness & lateral belt	20.0	15.4	17.4
Lateral belt only	70.0	84.6	78.3
Unrestrained	10.0	0.0	4.3

Table 7. Patient Restraint Use in SCI Crashes

Source: SCI Crash Reports, 2012-2018. Note: Shoulder harnesses were not available for use in 3 of the crashes.

Approaches to Addressing the Identified Issues

The SMEs and research staff discussed possible countermeasures that could address issues identified in the crash data analyses and SCI report reviews. Four priority areas were identified to improve ground ambulance safety: (1) Strengthen EMS organization safety polices; (2) Reduce ambulance operator errors through training; (3) Create a culture of safety; and (4) Adopt new vehicle safety designs or technologies. Below is a list of these countermeasures; references to existing resources on a given topic are provided when possible.

Strengthen EMS Organization Safety Policies

- 1. Occupant Restraint Use
 - A. Require all occupants to be properly restrained when the vehicle is motion
 - B. Require clinicians in the patient compartment to use restraints even when providing care to patients
 - i. Treat patients prior to transport when possible
 - ii. Position and secure equipment that may be needed prior to transport
 - iii. If it is absolutely necessary to get up while the vehicle is in motion to provide care, return to seat and proper restraint use as soon as possible
 - C. Require all patients to be secured to the stretcher with both lateral belts and shoulder harnesses
 - D. Secure child patients as recommended given the situation *Working Group Best-Practice Recommendations for the Safe Transportation of Children in Emergency Ground Ambulances* (NHTSA, 2012)
 - E. Check the condition and tension of belts as part of routine vehicle maintenance checks
 - F. Submit complaints about restraint defects (and other vehicle defects) to the NHTSA Office of Defects Investigations at www.nhtsa.gov/report-a-safety-problem
- 2. Ambulance Operation
 - A. Develop a detailed policy on when to use lights and sirens *Lights and Siren Use by Emergency Medical Services (EMS): Above All Do No Harm* (Kupas, 2017)
 - i. Reduce overall lights and siren use
 - ii. Only use lights and sirens during patient transport when the patient's clinical outcome may be improved by the estimated time saved
 - iii. Require a full stop at all stop signs or red traffic signals before proceeding with caution when using lights and sirens
 - B. Limit speed to the maximum posted speed limit at all times
 - C. Require pre-planning route before the ambulance is in motion
 - D. No phone or other handheld electronic device use while the ambulance is in motion
- 3. Fatigue Management
 - A. Develop a fatigue risk management plan *Implementation Guidebook 2018 Fatigue Risk Management Guidelines for Emergency Medical Services* (Patterson & Robinson, 2018)
 - B. Measure and monitor fatigue using fatigue or sleepiness survey instruments
 - C. Limit shift duration to less than 24 hours
 - D. Educate and train personnel on fatigue mitigation strategies

- i. Caffeine should be accessible as a fatigue countermeasure
- ii. Give EMS personnel the opportunity to nap while on duty
- E. Evaluate the impact and monitor the progress following fatigue management recommendations

Reduce Ambulance Operator Errors Through Training

- Require all operators to complete an ambulance-focused emergency vehicle operator course (e.g., Emergency Vehicle Operators Course (Ambulance): National Standard Curriculum [NHTSA, 1995]) that covers various topics
 - A. Hazard anticipation and avoidance
 - B. Situational awareness
 - C. Defensive driving skills
 - D. Proper clearing of intersections
 - E. Inclement weather driving skills
 - F. State-specific driving laws as applied to ground ambulances
- 2. Require recurring training specific to the ambulance being used

Create a Culture of Safety

- 1. Consistently enforce safety policies Review and revise current standard operating procedures to meet current guidance
- 2. Make safety improvements an ongoing effort
- 3. Conduct ongoing personnel safety checks and screenings
 - A. Operator/driver license
 - B. Physical fitness
 - C. Mental fitness

Adopt New Ambulance Safety Designs or Technologies

- 1. Patient compartment redesign Ambulance Patient Compartment Human Factors Design Guidebook (Avery et al., 2015) and Improving EMS Worker Safety in the Patient Compartment (Green, 2017)
 - A. Make sure patient and supplies are within arms-reach of clinician while properly restrained
 - B. Increase clearance space around clinician's head to reduce risk of severe head trauma
- 2. Adopt new safety technologies when possible
 - A. Automatic emergency braking
 - B. Backup cameras
 - C. Lane centering/keeping
 - D. Blind spot monitoring
 - E. Collision warnings
 - F. Integrated GPS navigation

Discussion

This study examined national crash data from several sources and conducted detailed reviews of reports from NHTSA's special crash investigations of ambulance crashes to provide a snapshot of ambulance-involved motor vehicle crashes for the years 2012 to 2018. The study showed that ambulance-involved fatal crashes remained relatively rare events with national averages of 24.7 fatal crashes and 28.4 fatalities per year reported in FARS for 2012 to 2018. This suggests the average number of annual fatalities is down from the 33 per year reported in NHTSA's prior study that covered 1992 to 2011.

Most fatalities in this study (52.3%) were occupants of other vehicles, which is lower than the 63 percent reported for 1992 to 2011. This study found a higher percentage (34.2%) of those killed were ambulance passengers (i.e., front seat passengers, clinicians, or patients in the cabin) compared to 21 percent reported for 1992 to 2011. Ambulance operators/drivers still represented a small percentage (6%) of fatalities for 2012 to 2018, which is like the 1992 to 2011 finding of 4 percent. Based on these results, developing approaches to preventing fatalities among non-driver occupants of ambulances (patients and clinicians in the cabin) and helping to avoid crashes with other vehicles to protect occupants of those vehicles could lead to notable gains in terms of fatality prevention for ambulance-involved crashes.

The FARS data also showed that, for 2012 to 2018, some 45.7 percent of fatal crashes occurred during "emergency use" which is lower than the 58 percent reported for 1992 to 2011. The addition of new data codes starting in 2013 allowed a more detailed look at the 2013 to 2018 FARS data and revealed that 28 percent of the ambulance-involved fatal crashes were reported to have an ambulance with lights and sirens active at the time of the crash. These findings suggest that most ambulance-involved fatal crashes involve ambulances that are not in emergency use and when lights and sirens are not active.

Analyses of PDO and injury (excluding fatalities) crash estimates from NHTSA's NASS GES and CRSS databases showed patterns of results that were like those found in NHTSA's prior study of data from 1992 to 2011. As noted throughout this report, however, the change from the NASS GES to CRSS data system limits comparisons over time and any results that combine data from the two sources should be interpreted with caution. With these limitations in mind, there was still clear evidence that most persons injured in ambulance-involved crashes were occupants of other vehicles or non-driver ambulance occupants. This finding is not surprising given the size of an ambulance compared to most passenger vehicles and what is known from previous research that has found crashes involving ambulances result in more injuries than crashes among similarsized vehicles (Ray & Kupas, 2005). The current study also found very low estimated counts of non-occupants in crashes involving ambulances.

The injury data did show that about 59 percent of the estimated injury crashes involved an ambulance in emergency use at the time of the crash, which is like the 59 percent reported for the 1992 to 2011 data. Reported emergency use was slightly lower in the later years included in this study, but the reduction could be the result of the CRSS (nationally representative sample of police-reported traffic crashes) redesign in 2016. When lights and sirens use data became available in 2013 to 2018, the current study found that about 36.2 percent of the estimated injury crashes were reported to have lights and sirens active at the time of the crash. Like the fatality data, the injury crash findings suggest the biggest gains in injury prevention are to be had by

focusing on ways to improve safety for non-driver occupants of the ambulance to avoid crashes with other vehicles to prevent injuries among those occupants.

To get a more detailed look at the issues involved with selected crashes, SMEs in ambulance operations and crash investigations completed extensive reviews of 27 SCI reports published on ambulance crashes that occurred from 2012 to 2018. The results showed that almost all (92.6%) of the crashes involved some form of ambulance operator/driver error that factored into the crash. Lights and sirens were active in 40.7 percent of the crashes, which reinforces the notion that most of the crashes are taking place when the ambulance was not using lights and sirens. The experts did note, however, that emergency lights and sirens were often used in situations that are not recommended according to current best-practice guidelines such as during an interfacility transfer or medical transport of a non-critical patient. Improper clearing of intersections, traveling against red lights, and operator fatigue were also noted as factors that appeared in the special reports.

A key problem identified in the SCI report review was a lack of proper restraint use by clinicians and patients in the patient cabin at the time of the crash. Only 8.8 percent of clinicians were properly restrained during the crashes covered by the SCI reports. While 95.7 percent of patients were restrained in some manner, only 17.4 percent of the patients were properly restrained using both lateral belts and shoulder harnesses. This appears to be an issue that has persisted, or even become worse, since NHTSA last looked at SCI reports for 1992 to 2011. The prior study found 30 percent of patients had shoulder and lateral harnesses in use and 16 percent of the care providers were restrained. While the small sample size of SCI report cases limits the generalizability of these findings, the low observed belt use across the two studies suggests this is an area that needs additional attention to improve safety for patients and clinicians.

Overall, the issues identified by this study are not new and some countermeasures already exist to address many of the problems. NHTSA and others have long recommended that all operators complete an emergency vehicle operator course that is specific to ambulances (NHTSA, 1995; Thomas et al., 2019). Guides exist on when to use lights and sirens and how to implement a quality fatigue management program for ambulance operators and clinicians (Boone et al., 2013). Ambulance patient care compartment standards have been redesigned to make it easier for clinicians to remain safely restrained while treating patients but many older ambulances without these updates remain in service. Once new vehicle safety designs or technologies are adopted, clinicians will need training on how to properly use the new designs. All these countermeasures, however, require a commitment at the organizational level to implement good policies and continuous monitoring of operators and clinicians to ensure best practices are always followed. If organizations, operators, and clinicians all buy-in to creating a culture of safety, the entire EMS system and the patients served will benefit from all-around safer operations on the roadways.

Limitations

While FARS is a census of fatal crashes in the United States, NASS GES and CRSS only provide estimates of crashes and injuries using a sample of crashes. The actual number of ambulance-involved crashes across the country could be much higher or lower than the estimates provided in this report. A more accurate count would require reviewing the entirety of each State's crash data system for the period of interest, which would be both costly and time consuming. Also, the move from NASS GES to CRSS during this study's period could have impacted the findings because of the different sampling procedures used to obtain the crash reports included in each database. In addition, the SCI reports reviewed for this study cover a subset of severe crashes which limits the generalizability of the findings.

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Appendix A. Contractor Crash Coding Sheets for SCI Reports

The contractor used subject matter experts in crash investigations and ambulance operations to review the identified SCI reports and they completed the following coding sheet to summarize the most critical findings of each investigation. *(These coding sheets for Ground Ambulance Crash Investigations were not created by SCI)*.

	Sect	tion A: C	rash Locatior	and Co	ondit	ions		
City/Town nearest Crash:			Crash Date:		Crash Time:		# of Vehicles Involved:	
	Daylight	-	Dark-Not Lighte	d	Dari	k-Lighted	Dark-Unknown Lighting	
Light Condition	Dawn		Dusk	-	Oth		Not Reported	
	Clear		Cloudy		Rain	1	Fog, Smog, Smoke	
Atmospheric Conditions	Sleet/Hail		Snow		Blov	ving Snow	Blowing Sand	
	Severe Crosswir	nds	Other		Unk	nown	Not Reported	
					_			
Type of Intersection	Not an intersec		Four-Way		_	tersection	Y-Intersection	
.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	Five-Point, or N	fore	Traffic Circle		Rou	ndabout	Not Reported	
	Non-Junction		Intersection		linte	rsection-Related	Railway Grade Crossing	
Relation to Junction	Acceleration/D	coloration	Crossover-relat	-	_	red-Use Trail	Through Roadway	
	Acceleration/ D	eceleration	Crossover-relat	eg	sna	red-Use Trail	Through Roadway	
	Rural-Principal	Arterial Inter	state		Rur	al – Minor Arterial		
	Rural – Major C					al – Minor Collecto	r	
Roadway Function Class	Rural – Local Ro				-	an – Principal Arte		
(Land Use)	Urban – Princip		other Preeways		_	an – Minor Arteria		
	Urban - Collect				Urb	an - Local Road or	Street	
Include Addition	al Photos		nvironment/Conditic oadway where crash amage to objects str mbulance trajectory	occurred uck during o		🗆 Eviden	ce/Maneuvering	
				_				
			: Ambulance					
Ambulance Organi	zation Name:		of Members:		f of Volu	unteers:	# of Occupants in Ambo	
Organization Status	Volunteer	-	Non-Volunteer	<u> </u>	Mix	ed N/R	Passenger(s)	
Operation Type	Community, No	n-Profit	Private		Hos	pital	Government, Non-Fire	
Organization Type	Fire Departmen	t	Tribal		Not	Reported		
Type of Service	911 Response (Mutual Aid		_	amedic Intercept	Interfacility Transfer	
Requested	Medical Transp	ort	Standby		Oth	er (describe)	N/R UNK	
			Marken Transa		Res		Hazmat	
Primary Type of Service	911 Response Specialty Care 1	ransport	Medical Transp Air Medical	OF L		amedic Intercept	Hazmat	
	- specially care i	- and point	- All meanal		1 1 1 1 1	interespt		
Organization-Level Drug	Hiring purposes	only	Routine testing	1	Reg	uired after crash	Optional after crash	
Testing SOPs	Required after i							
Teacing and a								
resting service								

SCI Report Coding Sheet for Ambulance Crash Investigations

SCI Report #:_____

		Section	C: Aml	bu	lance (Veh	icle)	In	formation				
Ambulance	Type:				dentification	Г ⁽		ate Registration:				
				Nu	mber:				_	Extent of Damage		
[] Type 1 [] Type	2 [2 [] Type 3				· —						
		Make			Model			Year				
Ambulance Chassis		Walke			model			rear				
Amoulance chassis												
									-			
		Make			Model			Year		Pre-crash Vehicle		
Ambulance									Maintenance			
Manufacturer												
			-			-						
Video Cameras 🗆 Prese	Present, No	o Re	cord 🗆 Absent	□Un	ikno	wn 🗆 Not Reported	-					
Camera(s) Location/View:												
GPS Tracking	t, Record	ded Crash 🗆 Pr	resent, No I	Rec	ord 🗆 Absent	🗆 Unki	nov	vn 🗆 Not Reported				
Speed Monitor 🗆 Presen	t, Recor	ded Crash 🗆 P	resent, No	Rec	ord 🗆 Absent	🗆 Unk	no	wn 🗆 Not Reported				
		0	rash Scene	Phe	otos			Detailed Investig	zatio	n Photos		
Include Additional Pho	tos		age						exterior damage			
			erior Dama				D Detailed i			ior damage		
					ition of Vehicle		-					
			on D: A	m	bulance Co	ot In	to					
		Brand			Model			Serial Number		ot broke during crash?		
Patient Cot										Yes		
							1			Unknown		
Cot parts broken during cr	ash:								Unknown Not Reported			
		Brand		Model			Serial Number		Fastener broke during			
Cot Fastening System										crash?		
										Yes		
										No		
Fastener parts broken dur	ing cras	h:								Unknown		
							_			Not Reported		
		Shoulder harne	ess and		Lateral restra	aints		Shoulder harness	C	ot came out of fastening during crash?		
			lateral restraints		only			only		Yes		
Cot Restraint Type/Use					,			,		No		
		No restraints	used		N/A (not on					Unknown		
		No rescialito	useu		NVA (not on	000				Not Reported		
								Available, not		Cot Involved in		
Cot Shoulder Harness		Available, u	ised		Available, not	used		attached to		Injury/Death? Yes		
Restraint/Use								stretcher		No		
nestion, esc	Not available for this			Not Dece				Other:		Unknown		
		stretcher			Not Report	eu				Not Reported		
		0	rash Scene	Pho	otos				estigation Photos			
		🗆 Fin	al Resting	ting Position of Cot			2	Cot in use during crash				
Include Additional Photo								Detailed fastener syste	m da	amage		
								Detailed cot damage Close-ups on any damaged parts				
								close-ops on any dama	geu	parts		

			Se	ction E: Cra	sh						
Response Mode at	time of Crash	# In	jure	ed Persons:		į	# Fatalities:	# of	Motor Vehicles involved:		
-											
Lights and Sirens				Personnel	EMS Personnel						
No Lights and Sire	ens	Patient(s)		Patient(s)		Patient(s)					
Unknown		Passenger(s)			_	Passenger(s)					
			_				-1.1				
	Front-to-Rear		Front-to-Front								
Manner of Collision Angle				Rear-to-Side			Sideswipe-Opposite Direction				
	Rear-to-Rear	ar Other (describe) Not a Collision with a Motor Veh						tor Vehicle in Transport			
	Rollover/Overtur					_		_			
			Fire/Explosion		_	Immersion					
First Harmful Event	Motor Vehicle In- Motor Vehicle in			a ale a Traffic a como		_	Collision with Fixed (Joje	ct:		
				,		o hi			ath as \$ 67 in terms and		
	Motor vehicle in-	iransport :	stru	ck by cargo, Pers	ons or (UD,	ects set in motion from	n an	other MV in transport		
	No Rollover			Rollover, Trippe	ad by		Rollover, Untripped	—	Rollover, Unknown		
Rollover	No Rollover			Object/Vehicle			Kollovel, ontripped		Type		
				object/venicle				-	Tipe		
	Hospital-Destinat	ion		Other-Destinat	ion		Incident	Т	Available on Radio		
Crashed En Route to	Base		Unknown			Other (describe)					
							enter (essence)				
Short Description of Collisi	on:										
Ambulance at Fault	Reason for Fault										
Yes No Partially% Not Reported Unknown				Other: N/A - Oti							
How could this crash have been avoided?											
	C	rash Scene	Pho	otos			Detailed Invest				
Include Additional Pho		nal Resting	Pos	ition of	 Roadway where crash occurred 						
	Vehicles					 Skid marks or other evidence of maneuvering 					

		Secti	on F: Driv	/er Si	tati	istic	S			
Driver total length of service with company (years): 			Driver took EVOC: Yes No		- 	Descri	be emergency veh	icle oper	ations course/trainin	ig:
Total Ambulance Driving Experience (years):	Experience Shifts (hours):		How long on Shift (hours):			Violations Charged: 				
Condition (Impairment) at time of Crash:		None/Normal Impaired (prior injury) Emotional (depressed)				III, Blackout Asleep/Fa Deaf Blind Under the influence of alcohol, drugs, o				
Other Driver Contributir Factors (e.g., hours slep	• I									
Alcohol or Drug	Tested, Result:					Suspected but not tested				
Testing	Not suspected an	nd not test	ed			Unkr	nown	No	ot Reported	
Driver Maneuvered to Avoid	Did not maneuver Live Animal Unknown	Did not maneuver to avoid Obj Live Animal Mo					Poor Road Condit Pedestrian, Pedal		ddle, Ice, Pothole, etc. r Non-Motorist	.}
Driver Distracted by										
Driver			Drive	er Pre	vious Recorded Su	spensior	ns and Revocations:	-		
Driver P	ctions:		_		Drive	r Previous Other H	armful N	IV Convictions:	-	

		Se	ction G: EN	ЛS	Perso	nnel Cha	ara	cteristic	cs			
Person Primary Role: Driver Primary Patient Care Secondary Patient Ca	are Pro	der ovider	Personnel Certi First Respo EMT-Interr Advanced I Physician	fica nde ned	tion Leve er 🛛 liate 🗖			Sex: Male Female UNK N/R	Age (years):	Weight (ka Height (cn		
Total Length of Service for	r Ager	ncy (years):										
Ambulance Seating Position Providing Patient Care at Time of Crash		3 Second ri 4 Second ri 5 Third, mi 6 Third, rig 7 Fourth, le 8 Fourth, n 9 Fourth, ri bench)	it, passenger niddle	:)		1) (2))	3	() () () ()	6) (1) 8) 2)		
		-										
Headphones/Devices			munication Head									
		Non-Work	Headphones (e.g	., Al	irpoas)	Radio/L	oua	speaker	Not Re	ported		
Not Used – MV Occupant Restraint Use Shoulder Belt Only Used Restraint Used – Type Unknown				owr	Shoulder and Lap Belt Used Lap Belt Only Used Unknown if Restraint Used					N/R		
Ejection		Not Ejected	ł		Totally E	jected		Partially Ej	ected	Unknown		N/R
Ejection Path		Not Ejected – N/A Through Windshield			Through Side Door Through Back Door			Through Side Wind Other:				
Extrication	1	Not Extricat	ted		Extricate	ed		Unknown		Not Repo	rted	
Injury Severity		No Injury Incapacitat Died Prior 1			Possible Fatal Inj Unknow	ury			acitating Evi everity Unkn ted			
		Died at Sce	ne		Died en	Poute		Died withi	n 30 days of	the crash		
Died at Scene/en Route		Not Applica			Unknow		\square	Not Repor		and and an		
Ser	ious I	injuries						Source of S	Serious Inju	ies		
Cau	use of	f Death						Source	e of Death			

	Sec	tion H: Patien	t/Passenger Ch	aracteris	tics				
Person Role:		Patient Position Du		Sex:					
Patient		Fowlers	Lateral	Male	Age				
Passenger		Semi-Fowlers	Supine	Female	(years):	Weight (kg):			
Secondary Patient Ca	re Provider	Prone	Car Seat	UNK		Height (cm):			
,		Sitting	Unknown	□ N/R		neight (chi).			
		Not Reported	Other		——				
	1 Front sei	at, driver							
	2 Front sea	at, passenger							
	3 Second r	middle		-(4)	(o) (ര)(ല)			
	4 Second r	right							
Ambulance		iddle (standing)			\cap				
Seating Position	6 Third, rig	ght (forward bench)		'	(s)				
		ft (EMT seat side)			$ \sim$				
		iddle (patient/cot)			1 (w)			
		ght (center, bench)							
	10 Other,	right (rear bench)			(\sim			
					(
Receiving Patient Care	Yes					<u> </u>	_		
at Time of Crash	No								
	a state state of			et audalaa		tere d			
		– MV Occupant	1	_	and Lap Belt (
Restraint Use		der Harness and Later	al Restraints Used	_	Cot Lateral Restraints Used				
		Belt Only Used			Lap Belt Only Used Unknown if Restraint Used N/i				
	Restraint	Used – Type Unknown	n Unknown if Restraint Used						
Fination			Tabally Sinchool	Dentially P		1 teleseure	N/2		
Ejection	Not Ejecte	d	Totally Ejected	Partially E	jected	Unknown	N/R		
						Unknown	N/R		
Ejection Ejection Path	Not Ejecte	ed – N/A	Through Side Door		ijected	Unknown	N/R		
	Not Ejecte			Through 5		Unknown	N/R		
	Not Ejecte	ed – N/A Vindshield	Through Side Door	Through 5	Side Wind				
Ejection Path	Not Ejecte Through V	ed – N/A Vindshield	Through Side Door Through Back Door	Through S Other:	Side Wind	Unknown Not Reporte			
Ejection Path	Not Ejecte Through V	ed – N/A Vindshield	Through Side Door Through Back Door	Through S Other:	Side Wind	Not Reporte			
Ejection Path	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrica	ed – N/A Vindshield	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated	Through : Other: Unknown	Side Wind	Not Reporte			
Ejection Path Extrication	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrica	ting Injury	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury	Through : Other: Unknown	Side Wind	Not Reporte			
Ejection Path Extrication	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrica No Injury Incapacita	ting Injury	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo	Side Wind	Not Reporte dent Injury own			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrica No Injury Incapacita	ting Injury	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo	Side Wind	Not Reporte dent Injury own			
Ejection Path Extrication	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrica No Injury Incapacita Died Prior	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo	Side Wind	Not Reporte dent Injury			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at Sci Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo	Side Wind Side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incay Injured, S Not Repo Died with	Side Wind Side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at Sci Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo	Side Wind Side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at Sci Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo	Side Wind Side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at Sci Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo	Side Wind Side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route Ser	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at Sci Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo Cause of Dea	Side Wind Side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route Ser	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at So Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo Cause of Dea	side Wind side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted th/Serious Inj	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route Ser	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at So Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo Cause of Dea	side Wind side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted th/Serious Inj	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			
Ejection Path Extrication Injury Severity Died at Scene/en Route Ser	Not Ejecte Through V Not Extrice No Injury Incapacita Died Prior Died at So Not Applic	ting Injury to Crash	Through Side Door Through Back Door Extricated Possible Injury Fatal Injury Unknown Died en Route	Through 5 Other: Unknown Non-incaj Injured, S Not Repo Died with Not Repo Cause of Dea	side Wind side Wind pacitating Evic everity Unkno rted in 30 days of rted th/Serious Inj	Not Reporte dent Injury own the crash			

DOT HS 813 480 July 2023



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National Highway Traffic Safety Administration



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